Scientists' political behaviors are not driven by individual-level government benefits. by Zhang, Baobao & Mildenberger, Matto
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Previously Published Works
Title
Scientists' political behaviors are not driven by individual-level government benefits.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/782907d0
Journal
PloS one, 15(5)
ISSN
1932-6203
Authors
Zhang, Baobao
Mildenberger, Matto
Publication Date
2020
DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0230961
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Scientists’ political behaviors are not driven by
individual-level government benefits
Baobao Zhang1☯*, Matto MildenbergerID2☯
1 Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States of America, 2 Department
of Political Science, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States of America
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* baobaozhangresearch@gmail.com
Abstract
Is it appropriate for scientists to engage in political advocacy? Some political critics of scien-
tists argue that scientists have become partisan political actors with self-serving financial
agendas. However, most scientists strongly reject this view. While social scientists have
explored the effects of science politicization on public trust in science, little empirical work
directly examines the drivers of scientists’ interest in and willingness to engage in political
advocacy. Using a natural experiment involving the U.S. National Science Foundation Grad-
uate Research Fellowship (NSF-GRF), we causally estimate for the first time whether scien-
tists who have received federal science funding are more likely to engage in both science-
related and non-science-related political behaviors. Comparing otherwise similar individuals
who received or did not receive NSF support, we find that scientists’ preferences for political
advocacy are not shaped by receiving government benefits. Government funding did not
impact scientists’ support of the 2017 March for Science nor did it shape the likelihood that
scientists donated to either Republican or Democratic political groups. Our results offer
empirical evidence that scientists’ political behaviors are not motivated by self-serving finan-
cial agendas. They also highlight the limited capacity of even generous government support
programs to increase civic participation by their beneficiaries.
Overview
On Earth Day 2017, thousands of scientists and their supporters protested the Trump adminis-
tration in Washington, DC as part of the March for Science; marches in other American cities
drew tens of thousands [1]. Yet, other scientists express profound misgivings about such efforts
to engage in partisan politics. They criticize their colleagues for having “crossed the imaginary
line” from researcher to activist, worried that political advocacy might break the social contract
underlying public science and research funding [2]. From this perspective, scientists’ credibil-
ity as impartial actors requires withdrawing from political life [3].
Other scientists defend colleagues’ political engagement [4]. These scientists believe passive
information provision is insufficient in a world where objective facts are the subject of political
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debate [5, 6]. If political actors reject or discount severe risks to the public, it might be unethi-
cal for scientists to stay silent for fear that future research funding could be compromised [5].
These debates have spilled out into the public sphere. Many American political actors
sharply question scientists’ motives. Some have asserted that scientists’ political activity reflects
partisan preferences or self-interest in receiving government funding. For example, in recent
decades, the Republican Party has criticized scientists, threatening to cut science funding and
ignore evidence-based policies [7]. Similarly, American conservatives report over-time decline
in trust in scientists [8]. After the March for Science, the percentage of conservatives who
agreed that “scientists care less about solving important problems than their own personal
gain” increased [9].
These critiques of scientists echo arguments about policy feedback effects. Researchers who
study policy feedback argue that that government programs, such as subsidies for higher edu-
cation, can affect their beneficiaries’ political attitudes and behaviors [10, 11]. For instance, the
GI Bill increased the civic participation of the veterans who fought in WWII, particularly those
who came from disadvantaged backgrounds [12]. Likewise, the National Defense Education
Act of 1958, the Higher Education Act of 1965, and Title IX of the 1972 Education Amend-
ments expanded higher education opportunities to women and thus increased their political
participation [13]. Researchers suggest that government programs that support higher educa-
tion created engaged citizens through both resource effects (i.e., increasing the recipients’ eco-
nomic opportunities) and interpretative effects (i.e., making the recipients feel valued by the
government) [14]. Could these theories extend to scientists, and thus validate claims that scien-
tists’ political advocacy reflects vested interests in government resource provision?
Yet, despite contentious debates about the role of scientists in politics and policymaking,
arguments about scientists’ political motives have rarely been examined empirically. In this
paper, we use a natural experiment to test whether a major government subsidy for science
education, the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (NSF-GRF) Pro-
gram, increased civic engagement by scientists. Contrary to partisan critiques of scientists’
political behavior, our study finds no robust evidence that scientists’ motivations to engage in
science-related and non-science-related political advocacy are a function of individual-level
government benefits provision. Scientists who did not benefit from the NSF-GRF, compared
with scientists who benefited but are otherwise similar, were no less likely to vote, donate to
political candidates, or participate in the March for Science. Consequently, our research pro-
vides credible empirical evidence against rhetorical arguments that link scientists’ political
behavior with self-interested financial agendas. It also highlights the limited capacity of even
generous government support to trigger positive policy feedbacks.
Materials and methods
Empirical research strategy
Our empirical strategy leverages a natural experiment that uses the NSF-GRF to examine
whether receiving government benefits shapes scientists’ willingness to engage in political
advocacy. This U.S. government award provides a three-year tuition scholarship for graduate
studies in the nature and social sciences as well as a living stipend for three years. NSF-GRF
applications are highly competitive; in recent years, only about one-third of all applicants
receive any recognition from the NSF. Fellowship awardees are given tuition scholarships and
stipends; honorable mentions are recognized for their achievement but receive no financial
benefits.
Our research subjects are a special group of fellowship applicants who received either the
award (treated group) or honorable mention (control group) in any given year after receiving
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honorable mention in the previous year. For instance, our research subjects for the year 1998
are fellowship awardees and honorable mention recipients who received honorable mentions
in 1997. Conditional on performance in the previous year and other pre-treatment covariates
(e.g., application year, field of study, undergraduate university, graduate university at time of
application, gender, ethnicity, and immigration status), we argue that whether an applicant
receives a fellowship or honorable mention in this subsequent year is conditionally as-if ran-
dom. Social psychologists have used a similar research design to determine that winning an
NSF-GRF increased an individual’s likelihood of completing graduate school but did not
improve the individual’s labor market outcome [15].
A total of 6,428 applicants between 1995 and 2016 were eligible for inclusion in our sample;
the applicants and their basic biographical information are publicly available online. Given
budget constraints, we randomly sampled 2,210 applicants using stratified sampling; respon-
dents within each year/field-of-study stratum had a 1/3 probability of being sampled. Some
strata did not have at least one subject in each condition; we eliminated those strata and were
left with 2,119 subjects. For each subject, we collected the following information: full name at
the time of the NSF application, undergraduate institution, and graduate institution. Using
only this information, we were able to locate current contact information (e.g., email
addresses, mailing address, web contact form URLs) using public online searches. We could
not find any contact information for 27 subjects (1.2% of the sample), and so they were
dropped from the study.
Critically, our study focuses on causal inferences regarding the drivers of scientists’ mobili-
zation, not descriptive inferences about scientists’ political advocacy. Correspondingly, we
choose a sampling strategy tailored to causal inference-making over a design that optimizes a
descriptively representative sample of all American scientists. While our subjects are not a ran-
dom sample of American scientists, they represent a wide range of disciplines (e.g., computer
scientists, engineers, biologists) and research institutions (e.g., universities, private companies,
the government).
Data
We conducted an original survey of individuals who applied for the NSF-GRF during graduate
school between 1995 and 2016 in late April 2017, in the immediate aftermath of the March for
Science. To recruit individuals, we emailed a link to the Qualtrics-hosted survey to scientists in
our sample who have an email address we can locate (N = 2, 090). We contacted a subset of
individuals without email addresses through web contact forms (N = 4) or via postal mail invi-
tations (N = 25). We recontacted respondents who did not take the survey a week later
reminding them to take the survey. We received complete responses from 499 individuals or
23% of our sample; our analysis used responses from 408 subjects because we selected year/
field-of-study blocks with at least one winner and one non-winner.
We report summary statistics associated with our sample in S1 Data of S5, S6, S7 and S8
Tables. In particular, we find no significant differences between survey respondents and non-
respondents’ background characteristics besides that respondents are more likely to be male
and have applied for the fellowship in later years.
Our survey measured a series of political attitudes and behaviors, including 1) the subjects’
support for the March for Science, 2) their attitudes towards government funding for science,
3) their public communication of research findings, 4) their political identity, and 5) their will-
ingness to donate to non-profit organizations (including ones with political agenda) through a
donation experiment, detailed in the S1 Data of S1 File. There, we also provide a full copy of
our survey instrument.
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For all individuals in our sample (irrespective of whether an individual responded to our
survey), we also compiled applicants’ political donation records using the OpenSecrets.org’s
Donor Lookup tool. We manually matched applicants to the political donation records via
name, city, and employer (if available). Out of 2,119 subjects, we were able to match 114 sub-
jects (5.4%) to political donations; we coded unmatched subjects as not having made any polit-
ical donations. We detail the procedure used to match subjects with donation records in the
S1 Data of S1 File.
Balance tests
Our research design depends on the presence of balance in subjects’ background characteris-
tics between our treated and control groups. To evaluate this feature of our design, we analyzed
the natural experiment as a block-randomized experiment (assuming complete randomization
within block), where each block is a year/field-of-study. There are a total of 56 year/field-of-
study blocks. For each background characteristic, we used the following inverse propensity-
weighted (IPW) linear regression to estimate the differences in applicant characteristics
between the award winners and non-winners:
WSSðb;pÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
1
pi
½Xi   ðaþ bAiÞ�
2
ð1Þ
where pi is the probability that subject i is in the condition that they are in given their year/
field-of-study, Xi is the background characteristic of subject i, and Ai is an indicator variable
for subject i’s award status. b^ is the estimate of the difference in the background characteristic
between the winners and non-winners. We used IPW linear regression because subjects have
different probability of getting an award depending on their year/field-of-study. These proba-
bilities range from 0.17 to 0.83, with a mean of 0.45 and a median of 0.50.
We performed balance tests to assess whether the award winners are different from the
honorable mentions along five metrics: 1) undergraduate university is an Ivy League, 2) under-
graduate university is an Ivy League Plus (the Ivy League plus MIT, Caltech, Stanford, Univer-
sity of Chicago, Duke, and UC Berkeley), 3) graduate university (at the time of application) is
an Ivy League, 4) graduate university (at the time of application) is an Ivy League Plus, 5) pre-
dicted gender of the applicant. The gender of the applicant was predicted using first name data
from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA). We performed web searches for those
applicants with gender-neutral names or names not within the SSA database to determine
their gender.
In Fig 1, we find that award winners and non-winners are not statistically different when it
comes to the quality of their undergraduate or graduate institutions, though winners are 5.7
percentage points (SE = 2.3) less likely to be predicted male compared with non-winners. This
difference is perhaps not surprising because the NSF seeks to increase diversity in science edu-
cation; as a result, application reviewers might favor women and ethnic minorities. To address
this imbalance in background covariates, we conditioned on predicted gender (along with self-
reported racial identity and place of birth in the survey analysis), along with the quality of edu-
cation background covariates, in subsequent analyses.
Aside from gender, we find no statistical or substantive differences between in survey sam-
ple winners and sample non-winners in background covariates (e.g., quality of education, eth-
nicity, or U.S.-born). Furthermore, these background characteristics do not individually or
jointly predict who won a fellowship (see S1 Data of S7 and S8 Tables. These results increase
our confidence that treatment assignment (whether an individual received an NSF or honor-
able mention) is conditionally as-if random in our survey sample.
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Finally, as shown in Fig 2, there are no statistical or substantive differences between award
winners and non-winners regarding missing email addresses or all other contact information.
Those who were given an award were more slightly likely to have a “.edu” email address, sug-
gesting that winners are more likely to work in academia.
Analysis of main outcomes
We use the following IPW linear regression to estimate the effect of winning a fellowship on
the outcome of interest:
WSSðb; θ; τ;pÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
1
pi
Yi   aþ bAi þ
XK
k¼1
yk
�Xi;k þ
XK
k¼1
tkAi �Xi;k
 !" #2
; ð2Þ
where Yi is the outcome measure for applicant i and all other variables are the same ones
described previously. b^ is the estimate of the individual-level average treatment effect of receiv-
ing a fellowship on the outcome. We mean-centered the background covariates, Xk, so that a^
represents the estimate of the mean outcome for the non-winner group (i.e., the baseline). For
the donation outcomes, the background covariates include quality of the subjects’ undergradu-
ate and graduate institutions and their predicted gender. For the survey outcomes, the back-
ground covariates include those in addition to the subjects’ self-reported racial identity (i.e., as
Black/Hispanic/Native American; as Asian) and whether they self-reported as being born in
the U.S. We adjusted for the background covariates, even when there is balance in background
covariates between winners and non-winners, to increase the precision of our estimates [16].
Fig 1. Comparing differences in background characteristics between winners and non-winners. N = 2, 119. We find a slight
imbalance between treated and control groups only in predicted gender; however, the groups are balanced on the quality of
undergraduate university and quality of graduate university.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230961.g001
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Results
Receiving a fellowship did little to change scientists’ political attitudes or self-reported behavior
(see Fig 3). Interestingly, winners’ support for the March for Science is 3.5% lower than non-
winners’ support; however, this difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Award
winners do not indicate greater support for federal funding for the sciences, for the NSF, or for
the NSF-GRF Program. Neither does winning the fellowship induce respondents to communi-
cate their research findings with policymakers and journalists more frequently. Winning the
fellowship do little to alter the respondents’ political party affiliation. Winners are somewhat
more conservative in terms of political ideology, but this effect is not robust to an alternative
model specification where we do not include background covariates (see S1 Data of S2 Table).
Finally, in the donation experiment, respondents’ willingness to donate, whether in general or
to organizations with a political agenda, is unaffected by their award status.
Fig 2. Comparing differences in contact information between winners and non-winners.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230961.g002
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We then directly evaluated individuals’ political participation using campaign donation
data. This analysis was conducted across all individuals in our sampling frame (N = 2, 119),
rather than simply across individuals who responded to the survey (N = 499). We do not find
that applicants who were awarded the fellowship gave larger political donations to Democratic
candidates or causes, as seen in Fig 4.
For a further robustness check on the impact of the fellowship on political donation
amounts, for each outcome, we conducted a randomization inference test to test the sharp null
hypothesis of no individual treatment effect. For our test statistic, we used the Wilcoxon rank
statistic because it is robust to outliers [17]. For each outcome, we performed 1,000 simulations
assuming the sharp null and the block randomization in our existing data to get the randomi-
zation distribution of the test statistic. Each one-sided p-value is the proportion of the random-
ization distribution that is more extreme than our observed test statistic. We find that the two-
sided p-values (twice the one-sided p-values) are all above 0.90; therefore, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no individual treatment effect for each outcome.
Fig 3. Effect of being awarded the NSF graduate research fellowship on political attitudes and behavior. N = 408. The error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals calculated from the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. S1 Data of S1 Table contains the effect estimates, standard errors,
two-sided p-values, and baseline estimates.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230961.g003
Fig 4. Effect of being awarded the NSF graduate research fellowship on political donations. N = 2, 119. The error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals calculated from the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. S1 Data of S3 Table contains the effect estimates, standard errors, two-sided
p-values, and baseline estimates.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230961.g004
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Discussion
In sum, the null results of award receipt on campaign donations and survey responses suggest
that receiving the award did little to change respondents’ political attitudes or behavior. More
broadly, we conclude that individual government benefits do not appear to shape scientists’
willingness to engage in either science-related or non-science-related political advocacy. NSF
fellowship winners are no more likely than non-winners to support and participate in the
March for Science or make political donations.
In the S1 Data of S1 File, we also report the results of two experiments embedded in our
survey. In Experiment 1, we randomly divided the survey sample into three groups. The first
group received a politically neutral statement about the 2017 March for Science. The second
group received the same message with explicit noting that “many March participants wanted
to resist Republican party attacks on science and protest federal science policy’s general direc-
tion.” A third group received a message that framed the perceived attacks as coming from the
Trump administration rather than the Republican Party. Results are reported in S1 Data of
S14 Table. Support for the March for Science is equivalent across all conditions. This suggests
our sample’s support for political advocacy is relatively non-responsive to partisan cues.
In Experiment 2, we presented respondents with a simple vignette describing the climate
advocacy behavior of a hypothetical scholar. We varied both the scholar’s discipline (atmo-
spheric chemistry vs. economics) as well as the nature of the scholar’s advocacy (communica-
tion about atmospheric climate science, public endorsement of a carbon tax, public
endorsement of a carbon tax plus endorsement of political candidates who support carbon
taxes). Results are reported in S1 Data of S2 Fig. We find that scientists’ comfort with political
advocacy does not shift as a function of advocacy content. Scientists are as comfortable with a
peer advocating for a carbon tax and endorsing candidates who support climate policies, as
they are with a peer who limits their advocacy to climate science narrowly.
These results, taken together with our core political advocacy and donation findings, offer
an empirical basis to doubt criticism of scientists as being motivated by self-interested political
or financial agendas. Other potential mechanisms might contribute to this null finding. While
the size of the benefit is significant (amounting to over $200,000 in recent years) and the pro-
gram is highly visible (recipients receive regular communication from the NSF), its duration is
only three years. Furthermore, the program’s beneficiaries might not view the fellowship as a
government social program but rather as just reward for their hard work—much like the
many Americans who failed to recognize that Social Security is a government social program
[18]. As a result, the recipients might not have acknowledged the need to engage in politics to
defend the program or the NSF. Alternatively, scientists may fear the loss of future government
funding. The March for Science instructed protesters not to wear attire that would identify
their universities, use government-funded websites for advertising the protest, or communi-
cate about the March using their institutional email accounts [19]. Because participating in
partisan politics could jeopardize their careers, scientists may be reluctant to speak out.
One likely explanation for these findings is the high baseline levels of political engagement
in our sample. Evidence from our survey and other surveys of scientists suggest that scientists,
as a whole, are politically engaged; interventions to increase their political engagement is likely
to hit a ceiling. As the baseline (non-winner) estimates in S1 Data of S1 and S2 Tables show,
non-winners in ours survey sample support increasing government funding for science,
endorse the March for Science, and overwhelmingly identify as Democrats. More than one-
third of the survey sample participated in the March for Science, a costly form of political par-
ticipation. Regarding a less costly but common form of civic participation, over 98% of both
sample winners and non-winners reported they have registered to vote. We also note that
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government benefits received at an early stage in an individual’s career may have different
long-term effects than benefits received at later stages. Follow-up work could investigate the
causal effects of other government grant-making programs.
However, none of these potential explanations provide evidence in support of critics’ key
claim: that scientists’ political behavior reflects individual financial self-interest. Even at a
moment of heightened science politicization, we cannot find empirical evidence in support of
the proposition scientists’ political behavior is shaped by having received individual-level gov-
ernment benefits provision. Scientists and their critics should look elsewhere to make sense of
scientists’ political interventions.
Supporting information
S1 Data. Online supplement for: Scientists’ political behaviors are not driven by individ-
ual-level government benefits.
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